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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
W. Scott Henwood"
and Jacque Smith Clarke**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year represents only the second full survey period' in which the

"new" Georgia Evidence Code, Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) title 24, takes effect. These new rules took effect on January
1, 2013. The rules conform in large part to the Federal Rules of
Evidence and continue to change the face of evidence law in Georgia.
This Survey highlights cases decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals
and the Georgia Supreme Court between June 1, 2014 and May 31, 2015
that have made an impact on evidence law in Georgia. This year's
Article provides insight into the courts' findings, particularly regarding
similar transaction evidence and multiple varieties of hearsay exceptions. Changes evidenced by new case law are outlined below and
organized by topic.

* Founding Partner in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1981); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1984).
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State Bar of Georgia.
** Of Counsel in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.B.A., 1976); Woodrow Wilson College of Law (J.D., 1978). Former Reporter
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State Bar of Georgia.
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1. For an analysis of evidence during the prior survey period, see John E. Hall, Jr., W.
Scott Henwood & Jacque Smith Clarke, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 66

MERCER L. REV. 81 (2014). Special thanks to Whit Carmon for his research assistance with
this year's Article.
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SIMILAR TRANSACTION EVIDENCE

This survey period illustrated some confirmation of consistencies
amongst the new and old rules regarding similar transaction evidence
alongside accomplice corroboration. In Bradshaw v. State,2 the Georgia
Supreme Court reconfirmed the accomplice testimony rule as "virtually
identical" to the corroboration provision in the old Evidence Code.3 In
Bradshaw, the defendant was convicted of malice murder for two
shooting deaths along with an accomplice after the trials were severed.
The crime involved two shootings after a marijuana deal went bad. The
State introduced similar transaction evidence of a crime that had
occurred six months before, where the defendant shot another individual
in the head because he would not pay for drugs that the defendant's
brother provided.'
The defendant argued on appeal that the similar transaction evidence
was improperly admitted and that his accomplice's testimony was not
properly corroborated.' The court found the evidence was properly
admitted and the accomplice's testimony was also sufficient to sustain
a felony conviction and, in its finding stated: "[T]o sustain a felony
conviction, the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated. This
Code section is virtually identical to the corroboration provision in the
old Evidence Code."6
The court continued, citing a case from the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals,' stating that "[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence contain no
provision regarding accomplice testimony, and the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice is sufficient to support a conviction in the
Federal Courts if it is not on its face incredible or otherwise insubstantial." The court explained that when the Federal Rules are silent and
it is clear that the General Assembly did not intend to change Georgia's
substantive law, the new provision is interpreted consistently with the
old unless a new provision of the Evidence Code displaced the law.'
Thus, in this survey period, the court continues to emphasize that the
rules will not be changing due to the new Evidence Code unless they are
actually statutorily replaced by a new provision.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

296 Ga. 650, 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015).
Id. at 653, 769 S.E.2d at 895.
Id. at 650, 651-52, 652, 769 S.E.2d at 893, 893-94, 894.
Id. at 652-53, 769 S.E.2d at 894.
Id. at 653, 769 S.E.2d at 894-95 (footnote and citations omitted).
United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1997).
296 Ga. at 654, 769 S.E.2d at 895 (quoting LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1562).
Id.
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The following cases illustrate the boundaries of admissibility for
similar transaction evidence. Brittain v. State,1 0 later cited in this
Article for its findings on hearsay evidence, exemplifies the court of
appeals interpretation of similar transaction evidence in an aggravated
assault, kidnapping, and burglary case." In Brittain, the State filed
notice of its intent to introduce similar transaction evidence regarding
a 2006 murder, kidnapping, and aggravated assault indictment along
with a 2007 breaking and entering conviction to show "course of conduct,
bent of mind, plan, scheme, motive, identity, intent, and lack of
mistake."' 2 The court explained that under the old Code, similar
transactions were admissible if the state showed that
(1) it [sought] to introduce the evidence not to raise an improper
inference as to the accused's character, but for some appropriate
purpose which has been deemed to be an exception to the general rule
of inadmissibility; (2) there [was] sufficient evidence to establish that
the accused committed the independent offense or act; and (3) there
[was] a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent
offense or act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends
to prove the latter.'3
The court then determined the evidence of the similar transactions
was sufficiently similar to meet these elements, finding that both
incidents involved persons known to the defendant, surreptitious entry
into their houses in the early morning, and use of a handgun, and, thus,
the trial court had not erred in admitting the similar transactions. 4
In Curry v. State,'" the court of appeals laid out the standard under
the Federal Rules of Evidence 6 for the admission of similar transaction
evidence." The case involves disturbing facts regarding the defendant's exploitation of teenage girls for acts of prostitution, but the case
shows how the court interpreted the allowance of similar transaction
evidence to show intent.'" The defendant argued on appeal that the
trial court violated O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b)' 9 by admitting testimonial
evidence of a third woman who claimed the defendant sold her to men

10. 329 Ga. App. 689, 766 S.E.2d 106 (2014).
11. Id. at 700-02, 766 S.E.2d at 116-17.
12. Id. at 700-01, 766 S.E.2d at 116.
13. Id. at 701, 766 S.E.2d at 116 (alterations in original) (quoting Matthews v. State,
294 Ga. 50, 52, 751 S.E.2d 78, 81 (2013)).
14. Id. at 702-03, 766 S.E.2d at 117-18.
15. 330 Ga. App. 610, 768 S.E.2d 791 (2015).
16. FED. R. EVID. 101-1103.
17. Curry, 330 Ga. App. at 613-16, 768 S.E.2d at 793-95.
18. Id. at 615 & n.11, 768 S.E.2d at 794 & n.11.
19. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) (2013).
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as a prostitute.2 ' The court of appeals disagreed, explaining that
although evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts "shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith," it may certainly be used for other purposes. 2 1
The court referenced the new Evidence Code in Georgia 22 and noted
that the Code is comparable to the Federal Rules, and that the court
gives consideration "and great weight to constructions placed on the
Federal Rules by the federal courts."23
The court then applied the Eleventh Circuit's three-part test to the
admissibility of similar transactions, which requires the following: (1)
the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's
character; (2) there must be sufficient proof for a jury to find by a
preponderance that the defendant committed the acts to be admitted;
and (3) that under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,24 the probative value
outweighs any undue prejudice.2 ' The court applied the test and found
"striking similarities between [the] offenses" where the testimony to be
admitted showed the victim was sold as a prostitute, held against her
will, and required to solicit her own clients.2 ' The defendant controlled
the time, prices, and location for the sexual acts, exerted complete
control over the victims, kept all monies received, and threatened the
victims to keep them from leaving.2 7 The defendant argued that course
of conduct and bent of mind were not permissible reasons for admitting
the similar transaction testimony.28 The court agreed, but found the
evidence was still admissible because it showed intent, which was a
permissible reason for admission under the new rules.2 9
III.
A.

HEARSAY

Forfeiture by Wrongdoing

This survey period also showed developments in hearsay exclusions
and exceptions.

In Brittain v. State, previously mentioned in this

20. Curry, 330 Ga. App. at 612, 768 S.E.2d at 793.
21. Id. at 612, 615, 768 S.E.2d at 793, 794.
22. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2013 & Supp. 2015).
23. Curry, 330 Ga. App. at 613, 768 S.E.2d at 793 (quoting Jones v. State, 326 Ga. App.
658, 660, 757 S.E.2d 261, 264 (2014), cert. granted, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 706 (2014)).
24. FED. R. EVID. 403.
25. Curry, 330 Ga. App. at 614, 768 S.E.2d at 794 (citing Jones, 326 Ga. App. at 660,
757 S.E.2d at 264).
26. Id. at 616, 768 S.E.2d at 795.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 614-15, 768 S.E.2d at 794.
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Article, the court fleshed out the proper standard for admission of
testimonial hearsay statements to law enforcement.o The defendant
appealed convictions for aggravated assault, kidnapping, and burglary,
arguing, among other alleged errors, the court erred in admitting
hearsay evidence under the doctrine of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing." The
statements were non-testimonial hearsay statements the victim made to
friends regarding her abduction by the defendant in 2007." Though
the trial took place before the effective date of the new evidence rules,
the court assumed, without deciding, that the trial court admitted the
hearsay under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and that the prior
evidence code would not have permitted hearsay evidence to be admitted
under this exception." The court went on to state:
[Any error in the admission of same does not justify reversal because
the same evidence would be admissible at a second trial. Indeed,
Georgia's new Evidence Code has codified the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
exception for hearsay evidence, providing that "[a] statement offered
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a
witness" shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness."
Thus, this testimony was not admitted in error." The defendant was
in the unlucky position of arguing that there was an error because while
it probably was erroneous during his first trial, the testimony would not
be erroneous if he were retried."
B. HearsayAdmissibility to Determine Attendance of Out-of-State
Witnesses
A niche hearsay area was further developed over this survey period
with a ruling from the Georgia Supreme Court on the admissibility of
hearsay when determining whether an out-of-state person is a material
witness to a Georgia criminal proceeding. In Parker v. State," the
Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether, under
the new Evidence Code, a determination of attendance can be made for

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

329 Ga. App. at 698, 766 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 689, 766 S.E.2d at 108.
Id. at 697, 766 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. at 698, 766 S.E.2d at 114.
Id. (second brackets in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(5) (2013)).
Id. at 698-99, 766 S.E.2d at 114-15.
Id.
296 Ga. 586, 769 S.E.2d 329 (2015).
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a witness under Georgia's Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without the State" based on hearsay evidence."
The court held that the evidence rules apply to a proceeding on a
motion to issue a material witness certificate because it is a fact-finding
proceeding.40 The court also detailed the exception scenarios and noted
that in the underlying case, which was based on a DUI, an exception did
apply.41 The court noted the new Evidence Code states that it "shall
apply to any motion made or hearing or trial commenced" after January
1, 2013.42 In the trial court, the defendant moved for witness certificates to call the five witnesses from the Intoxilyzer 5000's manufacturer
who resided in Kentucky. The defendant did not call any witnesses and
only offered (1) the Intoxilyzer 5000 printout card with his results,
including blood alcohol percentage readings of .158 and .157 and (2) a
transcript of his expert witness's testimony on the faulty computer
source code used in the breath alcohol testing machine in support of his
motion. The state objected to the evidence as hearsay and the defendant
argued the new rules of evidence-including hearsay rules-were not
applicable. The trial court eventually ruled that hearsay was not
allowed. The defendant was ultimately convicted, and the court of
appeals sustained the conviction.
In explaining the court's rationale, Justice Nahmias noted, "A party's
ability to obtain a material witness certificate turns on the court's
The court then addressed whether the
finding of certain facts."4
exceptions to O.C.G.A. § 24-1-2(b) 45 Would apply.46 The defendant
creatively analogized his case with proceedings for extradition or
rendition, in which the rules would not apply.4 The court explained
that where a provision of the new Evidence Code is different from the
Federal Rule "as interpreted by federal courts" they are required to
presume the Georgia General Assembly meant for Georgia's provision to
be different." The court further explained that exceptions provisions

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
(2013).
47.
48.

O.C.G.A. § 24-13-90 (2013).
Parker, 296 Ga. at 586, 769 S.E.2d at 329.
Id. at 586, 769 S.E.2d at 329-30.
Id. at 586-87, 590 & n.6, 769 S.E.2d at 329-30, 332 & n.6.
Id. at 588, 769 S.E.2d at 331.
Id. at 587-88, 589, 769 S.E.2d at 330-31, 331, 331-32.
Id. at 591, 769 S.E.2d at 332.
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-2(b) (2013).
Parker, 296 Ga. at 591-96, 769 S.E.2d at 333-35; see also O.C.G.A.
Parker, 296 Ga. at 591, 769 S.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 592, 769 S.E.2d at 333-34.

§ 24-1-2(c),

(d)
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do largely overlap, but the Georgia provision, O.C.G.A. § 24-1-2,49 does
not have a catch-all exception like the Federal Rules." The court
concluded the omission was intentional to prevent Georgia courts from
creating "patchwork exceptions to the applicability of the rules of
evidence, which had been a criticism of the old code."" Thus, the
Georgia Supreme Court ultimately enforced a strict interpretation of the
Georgia rules that are slightly different from the Federal Rules.52
The court also acknowledged an exception the defendant properly
relied on, found in O.C.G.A. §§ 24-1-2(c)(1) and 24-1-104," which states
the rules shall not apply to the "determination of questions of fact
preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be
determined by the court," including "[p]reliminary questions concerning
the qualification of a person to be a witness."54 Thus, the trial court
and court of appeals erred in rejecting the defendant's hearsay evidence
because it fell within an enumerated exception under the Georgia rules,
which are more limited than the Federal Rules."
C.

The Business Records Exception: Criminal and Civil Scenarios

There were two interesting cases from the court of appeals explaining
the proper interpretation of the business records exception to hearsay
under the new Evidence Code. In Roberts v. Community Southern
Bank," the court differentiated between two different business records
that were both offered in support of a motion for summary judgment
brought by the owner of a promissory note." The guarantor appealed
and the court of appeals affirmed on condition, explaining the applicability of the rules of evidence as related to the admissibility of evidence on
motions for summary judgment."
The court explained that "[a]ffidavits purporting to establish the
amount of a debt without accompanying business records, where
appropriate, are insufficient to sustain summary judgment." 9 The

49. O.C.G.A. § 24-1-2 (2013).
50. Parker, 296 Ga. at 594, 769 S.E.2d at 334-35.
51. Id. at 594, 769 S.E.2d at 334.
52. Id. at 592, 769 S.E.2d at 333-34.
53. O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104 (2013).
54. Parker, 296 Ga. at 594-95, 769 S.E.2d at 335 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-1-104).
55. Id. at 596, 769 S.E.2d at 336.
56. 331 Ga. App. 364, 771 S.E.2d 68 (2015).
57. Id. at 368, 771 S.E.2d at 72-73.
58. Id. at 364, 368-69, 771 S.E.2d at 70, 73.
59. Id. at 368-69, 771 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Walter R. Thomas Assocs. v. Media
Dynamite, 284 Ga. App. 413, 415, 643 S.E.2d 883, 885 (2007)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
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court then quoted O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6) of the new Evidence Code,O
which creates an exception to the hearsay rule for business records:
Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness ...
a memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses [is admissible], if (A) made at or near
the time of the described acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses; (B) made by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
personal knowledge and a business duty to report; (C) kept in the
course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (D) it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum,
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness or by certification . . . ."

As in the old code, the new Evidence Code gives the trial court discretion
to determine if a proper foundation was laid for the admission of
business records.62
The court also explained how summaries of voluminous business
records would be admitted-noting these records were admissible under
the old code, and the requirements were simply codified under the new
Evidence Code." Under the Code, voluminous records, "which cannot
conveniently be examined in court," are permitted "in the form of a
chart, summary, or calculation."64 The court emphasized, citing a 2013
Georgia case65 and a 1998 Sixth Circuit case,6 6 that one of the requirements for the admission of a summary is that the records on which the
summary is based are made available to the other parties to examine or
copy, so that "the opposing party who desires to attack the authenticity
or accuracy of [the] .

.

. summary" can do so or is able to otherwise offer

rebuttal evidence.6 7 Based on these standards, the court held that a
loan history report was admissible in support of the note holder's motion
for summary judgment as a business record, but explained that business
records regarding secondary interest without sufficient availability of
supporting documents were not admissible.68

60. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803 (2013).
61. Roberts, 331 Ga. App. at 369, 771 S.E.2d at 73 (alterations in original) (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(6)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 369 n.4, 771 S.E.2d at 73 n.4.
64. Id. at 369-70, 771 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-10-1006 (2013)).
65. Id. at 370, 771 S.E.2d at 73 (citing Hanna v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 323 Ga.
App. 321, 744 S.E.2d 894 (2013), cert. denied, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 986 (2013)).
66. United States v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104 (6th Cir. 1998).
67. Roberts, 331 Ga. App. at 370, 771 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Bray, 139 F.3d at 1109).
68. Id. at 371, 372-73, 771 S.E.2d at 74, 75.
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In an interesting case about shoplifting, the court held that a
shoplifting report was admissible in a criminal case because it was not
"made in anticipation of prosecution" and thus qualified as a business
records exception to the hearsay rule." In Thompson v. State," the
defendant was convicted of felony shoplifting, aggravated assault, and
possession of methamphetamine after he entered a Costco in Catoosa
County, picked up a camera and a video game console, removed them
from their packaging, and placed them in his pants. He then hid the
packaging, pushed the loss prevention officer over when he was
confronted at the exit, brandished a razor knife, and ran across the
parking lot in an attempt to escape. When he was apprehended by the
police shortly thereafter, the lieutenant searched him and found a
camera, a game console, a razor knife, a glass pipe containing methamphetamine, and various other drug paraphernalia in his pants. At trial,
the State called the store's assistant manager and introduced, over an
objection by the defense, a report prepared by the Costco loss prevention
officer that included the details of the shoplifting.'
On appeal, the court determined the report was admissible because it
did not indicate a lack of trustworthiness.7 2 The court emphasized the
report was not made at the request of the State and the officer who was
on the scene testified that "he was not sure that Costco was 'familiar
with what we needed for that criminal case.""' The court relied on the
fact that Costco prepares these reports every time there is an incident
involving shoplifting, which makes the report reliable.7 4
The dissent, drafted by Justice Barnes and concurred with by Justice
Miller, noted that this report should have been excluded.7 ' The dissent
explained that incident reports usually lack the reliability necessary for
admission under the business records exception.76 The dissent stated
that the majority "place[d] undue emphasis on the fact that the store
was not a party to the criminal prosecution" because "a business. . . still
has an 'interest in seeing that a shoplifting suspect is prosecuted
"M
The interesting views of the majority and the dissent on the

69. Thompson v. State, 332 Ga. App. 204, 208, 770 S.E.2d 369-70 (2015).
70. 332 Ga. App. 204, 770 S.E.2d 364 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 562 (2015).
71. Id. at 205-06, 770 S.E.2d at 367-68.
72. Id. at 210, 770 S.E.2d at 371.
73. Id. at 208, 770 S.E.2d at 369. The court also differentiated a federal case where the
report was prepared at the request of the FBI in a robbery case. Id.; see United States v.
Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1993).
74. Thompson, 332 Ga. App. at 207-08, 770 S.E.2d at 364.
75. Id. at 216-17, 770 S.E.2d at 375 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 217, 770 S.E.2d at 375.
77. Id. at 220, 770 S.E.2d at 377 (quoting the majority opinion).
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admissibility of internal loss prevention documents creates an issue that
has potential for reversal in the next survey period, especially considering the continuing reference to the other circuits' interpretations of the
Federal Rules.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This survey period produced novel and interesting decisions that
continue to shape evidence law in Georgia. Appellate decisions are
continuing to show how the new provisions apply, and the Georgia
Supreme Court is articulating the differences that have been intentionally preserved. The courts have been especially active in their interpretations of similar transaction admissibility standards and the hearsay
exceptions this period, both areas in which the rules in Georgia slightly
differ from the Federal Rules-intentionally. It will be interesting to see
what the next survey period focuses on and what federal case law works
its way into the courts' future interpretations of our current Evidence
Code.

